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Abstract 
 
The paper explores the implications of different autonomous demands, with differing 
rates of growth, in a demand-led growth model where policy makers are concerned 
about the ratios of public sector debt to income and external debt to income. The  
actual growth rate is explained in terms of the growth rate of aggregate demand, with 
emphasis in the formation of expectations about growth in the latter; and the relative 
importance in this regard of realised aggregate demand growth and autonomous 
demand growth, the latter being governed by export demand and public sector 
expenditure. Debt constraints - specifically, the ratio of public sector debt to output 
and the ratio of external debt to output – become relevant in the determination of the 
growth rate of government expenditure. The paper explores the likely interactions 
between debt constraints, the growth rate of aggregate demand and autonomous 
demand by means of dynamic simulations.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the present paper is to shed further light on the nature of demand-led 
growth, with explicit recognition of the constraints imposed by both public debt and 
foreign debt. It therefore takes as its starting point the non-marginalist position that 
growth is ultimately demand constrained; and, in particular, that growth is driven by 
the autonomous components of demand. For the purposes of this paper, we regard the 
key autonomous components of demand as export demand and government 
expenditure.  
 
As is well known however, the extent to which both of these expenditures are 
“autonomous” is not uncontroversial. Even from a non-orthodox perspective, and 
quite aside from any consideration about the pros and cons of discretionary fiscal 
policy, public sector expenditure is clearly subject to the concerns of policy makers 
about sustainable public sector debt trajectories. Additionally, recent decades have 
witnessed increased concern about links between public sector balances and external 
balance and thus in turn with foreign debt trajectories.2  
 
The focus of this paper is primarily on the dynamics of growth in the context of 
concern by policy makers about these two types of debt; while at the same time 
adopting demand-led approach to the explanation of growth, where the two key 
drivers of this growth are export demand and government expenditure.3 
 
Section 2 begins the analysis by deriving an expression for the actual growth rate of 
demand at any time in terms of actual growth rate in the preceding period, the 
expected rate of growth of aggregate demand, the expected rate of growth of 
autonomous demand and ratio of autonomous demand to income. Sections 3 and 4 
deal with the relationship between debt and the two autonomous components of 
demand; and this discussion in turn allows one to consider in a tentative way the 
complexities of demand-debt interaction. Section 5 outlines the nature of the steady 
state solutions to the model with debt constraints, while Section 6 considers 
alternative formulation for the determination of the rate of growth of government 
expenditure and the expected rate of growth of autonomous demand as a prelude to 
dynamic simulation of the model. Sections 7 and 8 provide a discussion of the results 
of these dynamic simulations. Section 9 provides some brief concluding notes. 
   
 
1
 I am indebted to participants of the Conference on "Institutional and Social Dynamics of Growth and 
Distribution" in Lucca, Italy, December, 2007 and to partcipants in seminars at the Centro Sraffa, 
Faculty of Economics, University of Rome, 3, in December 2007 and November, 2008, and 
participants at the Seventh Society of Heterodox Economists Conference, at University of NSW, in 
December, 2008, for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the present paper. Remaining errors and 
omissions are of course fully my own responsibility.  
2
 A reasonable interpretation of Australian experience of the last two and a half decades would put the 
current account of the balance of payments as a proportion of GDP and the public sector debt to income 
ratio as the overriding concerns in relation to fiscal policy.  
3
 The notion that the steady state outcome in a demand-led growth model corresponds to the rate of  
growth of autonomous demand is also not uncontroversial;  see Park, 2000, Barbosa-Filho, 2000, 
White, 2006, Cesaratto, et.al., 2003, Palumbo and Trezzini, 2003. 
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2. The actual growth rate – a simple model 
 
We seek a fairly simple explanation of the actual growth rate. Our analysis is formally 
conducted in terms of the growth rate of aggregate demand; the justification for this 
being that in the transition to a long-run equilibrium, the rate of growth of output will 
be converging on the rate of growth of demand. Production is assumed to take time, 
while circulation – when demands are expressed and supply is forthcoming – happens 
at the junction of two periods i.e. t/t-1. We start with the composition of aggregate 
demand at the end of period t, Dt 
 
t t t t tD C I G X M= + + + − t       …..(1) 
 
Where Ct, It, Gt ,Xt  and Mt refer respectively to consumption, investment, government 
expenditure and export demand expressed at the end of period t. With regard to 
consumption demand, this is properly a function of after-tax income inclusive of 
interest income on public debt and interest payments on external debt.4 Thus      
 
( ) ( ){ }t t t 1 t 1C c. Y 1 t r. B E− −= − + −       …..(2) 
 
where c is the propensity to consume, Yt is income/output in period t, r is the rate of 
interest, assumed the same for public debt B and external debt E. 
  
With regard to output, Yt, the immediate complication is that output levels have to be 
decided prior to the expression of demand, so that it is necessary for producers to 
formulate expectations about future demand. Of course this is also necessary for the 
formulation of investment decisions at the end of each period. We assume that 
producers attempt to forecast the growth rate of demand one-period ahead: in other 
words, for investment decisions at the end of period t, producers formulate an 
expectation about the growth rate of demand between t+1 and t. However, since, 
demand at the end of period t is not known prior to the formulation of investment 
decisions, the most recent demand level on which producers’ growth expectations can 
be based is that at the end of t-1. We therefore also assume that the growth rate 
expected between t+1 and t on that between t-1 and t-2. In particular, the expectation 
held at the end of period t concerning the level of demand at the end of t+1 is given 
by  
 
( 2et 1 t 1 t 1D D 1 g+ − += + )de
                                                
     ….. 
 
As noted above, the expected growth rate of demand between t+1 and t is based in 
part on the rate of growth of demand most recently observed, viz., gdt-1. But we add to 
this component two other considerations: first an allowance for the fact that 
expectations about demand in the past may have been incorrect and in turn capacity 
may have been deficient or excessive in relation to actual demand; and, second, that 
growth in the economy is partly driven by the scale of government and by external 
demand and producers are aware of this. The implication of this latter consideration is 
 
4
 Of course the influence of interest on debt on consumption demand is also indirect, via their impact 
on the nature of the debt constraints and in turn on the growth rate of government expenditure and the 
growth of income. 
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that producers take some account of the rate of growth of the economy as a whole and 
by implication of the exogenous components of demand when forecasting the growth 
rate of demand in their own sector.5 Putting these factors together gives as an 
expression for the expected rate of growth of demand as  
 
( ) ( )de exp d d det 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 2g .a 1 . g x. g gε ε+ − − − −⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎣ ⎦     …..(4) 
Where aexpt-1 refers to the expected rate of growth of autonomous demand between t 
and t+1. The second term on the right hand side of expression (4) represents the part of 
the expectation of future demand growth based on recent demand growth in the 
producer’s own sector; and this component includes an allowance for the extent to 
which expectations about demand growth in one’s own sector were incorrect in the 
light of most recent experience.  
 
Output in period t is given by 
 
( )det t 1 t 1Y D 1 g− += + ( ) ( ){ }d d wt 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1D . 1 .a 1 . g x. g gε ε− − − − −⎡ ⎤= + + − + −⎣ ⎦   
…..(5)  
 
If we assume everlasting fixed capital so that all investment is net investment, we can 
represent the investment level decided on at the end of period t in terms of the 
increment of demand expected between periods t-1 and t+1. In other words, 
 
 det t tI v.Y .g=        …..(6) 
 
where v is the desired capital to output ratio.  
 
With regard to autonomous demand, we assume this consists entirely of government 
expenditure and expenditure on exports, so that autonomous demand at time t, At, is 
 
ttt XGA +=        …..(7) 
and, as ratios to income,  
 
Y Yt
t t
t
AA G
Y
= = + YtX
                                                
      …..(8) 
where GYt and XYt represents the ratios of government expenditure and exports to 
income respectively. 
 
Substituting equation (5) for Yt in equation (2) allows one to express consumption as a 
function of demand;  and substituting equation (5) for Yt in equation (8) allows one to 
express aggregate autonomous demand, At, as a function of the ratio of autonomous 
demand to income, AYt, and demand. In turn, combining these manipulations with 
combining with equations (1), (4) and (6), allows one to express the growth rate of 
 
5
 This approach to the modeling of the expected growth rate is used for a two-sector model where fixed 
capital is taken account of explicitly in White, 2008. 
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aggregate demand, gdt as a function of growth rates in the preceding period and the 
ratio of autonomous demand to income in the preceding. In other words,  
 (d d d de exp Yt t 1 t 1 t 1g g g ,g ,a ,A− − −= )t     …..(9) 
 
Additionally, in view of equation (5), the rate of growth of output between period t 
and t-1, denoted gyt, can be written as 
( )d de det 1 t t t 1y
t de
t 1
g . 1 g g g
g
1 g
−
−
+ + −= +
de
−     …..(10)6 
Finally, it is worth also briefly clarifying the growth rate of autonomous demand. This 
can be expressed as 
1t
1tGtXt
t 1
.gg
a
−
−
+
+= α
α
      where     
t
t
t X
G=α   …..(11) 
 
It follows that  
 
( )
t Gt
2
t 1 t 1
da g g
d 1α α− −
−= +
Xt      …..(12) 
 
Starting from a situation where XtGt gg =  and supposing that gGt then rises above gXt, 
with gXt remaining constant, the numerator of the expression will be positive and the 
differential ( 1tt 'a − )α  > 0. α will be rising so that in the subsequent period (i.e.t+1), a 
will rise. If gXt then rises above gGt, , the differential ( )1tt 'a −α  < 0, and α will be 
falling so that in the subsequent period (i.e.t+1), a will also rise. 
 
It also follows from the expression for at, that at will converge to whichever of the 
two rates of growth – gXt, gGt – is the higher:  
 
Gt
1t
1tGtXt g
1
.ggLim
1t
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+
−
−
∞→− α
α
α  
…..(13) 
Xt
1t
1tGtXt
0
g
1
.gg
Lim
1t
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+
−
−
→− α
α
α  
 
3. Policy constraints and autonomous demands 
The more interesting question at this point concerns the determination of the two 
components of autonomous demand – government expenditure and export demand. 
For the purposes of the following discussion we assume that export demand is wholly 
                                                 
1
6
 Hence, if the expected rate of growth of demand remains is unchanged between t and t-1, then the 
growth rate of output will track the growth rate of demand, with a one-period lag, i.e. y d
t tg g −=  
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exogenous; while government expenditure is ultimately governed by concern about 
debt, specifically, the behaviour of the ratio of public debt to income and the ratio of 
foreign debt to income. 
Taking exchange rates also as exogenous and further assuming that the domestic 
economy has little or no influence over the interest rate on foreign debt the 
assumption that export demand is wholly exogenous implies that the only means by 
which the government could exert influence over the trade account and in turn over 
the current account and over the ratio of foreign debt to income is by manipulating the 
rate of growth of domestic demand. This in turn would affect the external debt to 
income ratio in at least two ways: indirectly through the trade account via a change in 
the rate of growth of imports; and directly via a change in the rate of growth of 
income.  
However, we also assume, significantly, policy makers are not necessarily concerned 
to the same degree about the foreign debt to income and public sector debt to income 
ratios. In particular, the analysis proceeds on the assumption that while governments 
would accept some rise in the level of external debt as a proportion of income, they 
will be much less tolerant of a rise in the public debt to income ratio from its current 
level. We think this reflects the more recent position of governments, certainly with 
respect to public debt. Thus, while an exogenous growth of exports together with the 
current and past growth rates of aggregate demand may entail some rise in external 
indebtedness, the past growth rate of demand – to the extent that it governs the current 
rate of growth of output - may act as a binding constraint on the rate of growth of 
public sector expenditures. 
In other words, we assume that the government is mindful of both the export to 
income ratio and the public sector expenditure to income ratio (to the extent that they 
have implications for foreign and public sector debt ratios), though, in the absence of 
control over interest rates on external debt and in the absence of considerable latitude 
for “cheap money” it is restricted to manipulating the public sector expenditure ratio. 
In contrast to an orthodox approach to growth however, we maintain that public sector 
expenditures will be an important driver of autonomous demand and thus of the rate 
of growth of output.7 
Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to articulate the relationships between the 
autonomous components of demand and the two debt to income ratios referred to 
above, albeit in a simplified way.      
Taking firstly the public debt to income ratio and assuming that any budget deficits 
are fully funded by the issue of government debt, one can write,  
t / t 1 t t t 1B G T r.B−Δ = − + −
                                                
     …..(14) 
where  represents the change in public sector outstanding debt, B, between end 
of t-1 and end of t; T, represents total tax revenue and r is the interest rate payable on 
t / t 1B −Δ
 
7
 We leave aside the issue of whether monetary policy, but affecting on interest rates on public sector 
debt, thereby influences the relationship between the public sector expenditure to income ratio and the 
public sector debt ratio. To the extent that the objectives of monetary policy are elsewhere, viz., 
inflation control, this may seem such an heroic assumption. 
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public sector debt. In terms of ratios to income, the public debt ratio at the end of t, 
, is given by Ytb
( )Yt 1Y Y
t t y
t
b . 1 r
b G t
1 g
− += − + +       …..(15) 
where t is the income tax rate (there are no other taxes), assumed constant and GY is 
the ratio of government expenditure to income. Similarly, the change in foreign debt 
between t and t-1, t / t 1E −Δ ,can be expressed as 
t / t 1 t t t 1E M X r.E−Δ = − + −      …..(16) 
Where M represents imports and r again is the relevant interest rate on foreign debt 
(hence, assumed the same as the interest rate on public debt) so that, the ratio of 
foreign debt to income at the end of t is given by  
( )Yt 1Y Y
t t y
t
e . 1 r
e m X
1 g
− += − + +      …..(17) 
where m is the import propensity, also assumed constant, and XY is the ratio of export 
demand to income. 
Bearing in mind the assumptions that t, r and m are constant, expressions (15) and 
(17) can be rewritten in the form of constraints respectively on the rate of growth of 
government expenditure consistent with a stable public debt to income ratio and the 
rate of growth of exports consistent with a stable foreign debt to income ratio, for any 
particular rate of growth of income. More precisely, expressing the ratio of 
government expenditure to income in period t as  
 
G
Y Y t
t t 1 Y
t
1 gG G .
1 g−
+= +       …..(18) 
and setting bYt = bYt-1, then solving for gGt, expression (15) becomes 
( ) ( )Y Y Yt 1 t t tG
t Y
t
b . g r t. 1 g G
g
G
− − + + −=
Y
   …..(19) 
The more pertinent form of this is as an inequality, viz.,   
( ) ( )Y Y Y Yt 1 t t t 1G
t Y
t 1
b . g r t. 1 g G
g
G
−
−
− + + −≤ −    …..(20) 
The right-hand side of this inequality shows the maximum growth rate of government 
expenditure, given r and t, the growth rate of income and the ratio of government 
expenditure to income from the preceding period, consistent with a constant public 
debt to income ratio. If we were to further simplify and assume an unchanging 
expected growth rate of demand, then from equation (10) (see footnote 6), we may 
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substitute the demand growth rate for the output growth rate in expression (20) so that 
the relevant constraint becomes 
( ) ( )Y d d Yt 1 t 1 t 1 t 1G
t Y
t 1
b . g r t. 1 g G
g
G
− − − −
−
− + + −≤     …..(21) 
We refer to this as the public debt constraint, hereafter PDC. 
One can similarly rearrange expression (17): setting eYt = eYt-1, solving for gXt and 
bearing in mind  
X
Y Y t
t t 1 Y
t
1 gX X .
1 g−
+= +       …..(22) 
yields 
( ) ( )Y d dt 1 t 1 t 1 t 1X
t Y
t 1
e . r g m. 1 g X
g
X
− − −
−
− + + −≥
Y
−    …..(23) 
Expression (23) represents the foreign debt constraint or FDC and represents the 
minimum growth rate of exports, consistent with a constant foreign debt to income 
ratio, given r, m, growth in demand in the preceding period (assuming a constant 
expected growth rate of demand) and the export to income ratio of the preceding 
period. 
Figure 1 below depicts the PDC which shows, for different levels of the growth rate 
of demand, gdt-1, the growth rate of government expenditure consistent with the 
constancy of the ratio of public debt to income, for a particular previous period value 
of that ratio, byt-1, as well for the ratio of government expenditure to income, Gyt-1. The 
area below the PDC represents combinations of gdt-1 and the rate of growth of 
government expenditure gGt which would lead to a reduction in the ratio of public 
debt to income; in other words, byt < byt-1. 
The diagram also includes a 45o line, points along which entail gdt-1 = gGt so that Gyt-1 
is unchanged. Since the slope of the PDC is equal to 
y
t 1
y
t 1
b t
G
−
−
+ , a positive public debt to 
income ratio (by > 0) and a primary budget surplus (t > Gy), the slope of the PDC is 
therefore greater than unity and thus the PDC is steeper than the 45o line. With an 
overall budget surplus and thus 
y y
t 1 t 1
y
t 1
t G b .r
G
− −
−
− −  > 0, lies wholly above the 45o line. On 
the other hand, points off the 45o line, where gG ≠ gdt-1, will obviously entail changes 
in Gy and thus changes in the slope of the PDC and both its intercepts. Points off the 
PDC will involve changes in the public debt to income ratio, by, and thus also changes 
in the slope and in both intercepts of the PDC.8 
                                                 
8
 Thus, it is only at a point of intersection of the PDC and 450 line where both by and Gy are constant 
and the PDC is not shifting. But if the PDC is steeper than the 450 line, such an intersection – in 
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 FIGURE 1  - DEMAND GROWTH AND THE PUBLIC DEBT CONSTRAINT
                                                                                                                                           
 
gGt 
y y
t 1 t 1
y
t 1
t G b .r
G
− −
−
− −  
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−
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b t
G
−
−
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At a point such as D for example with gdt-1= gdA and gGt = gGA, the ratio of government 
expenditure to income, Gy,  will be rising. However, since D is on the PDC, this 
combination of demand growth and government expenditure growth will keep the 
ratio of public debt to income constant (i.e. byt = byt-1). Hence, with a constant tax rate, 
t, the PDC function will become flatter.    
It can also be shown that with a total budget surplus (implied by the positive vertical 
intercept and negative horizontal intercept of the PDC), the horizontal intercept of the 
PDC increases and the vertical intercept decreases with a rise in Gyt-1.
9 Hence for 
example, the combination gdt-1= gdA and gGt = gGA, will lead to a shift in the PDC such 
as that represented by the dashed line in Figure 1.  
 
positive space – would require that the vertical intercept of the PDC be negative and thus that there is a 
total deficit (which is of course can coexist with a primary budget surplus). 
9 The horizontal intercept is given by 
y y
t 1 t 1
y
t 1
G b .r
G t
− −
−
t+ −
+ . Differentiating this with respect to G
y
t-1 yields 
( )
y
t 1
2y
t 1
2t b .r
G t
−
−
−
+
  which is positive provided 
y
t 1b .rt , which is clearly the case with a total budget surplus 
(i.e. t G ). With regard to the vertical intercept, 
2
−>
y y
t 1 t 1b .r 0− −− − >
y y
t 1 t 1
y
t 1
t G b .r
G
− −
−
− −
, the differential of 
this with respect to Gyt-1  is ( )
y
t 1
2y
t 1
b .r t
G
−
−
−  which is in turn clearly negative with a total budget surplus. 
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By contrast, consider the combination of growth rates at point F, gdt-1= gdA and  
gGt = gGB. In this case Gy will be falling; and by is also falling (F is in the shaded 
region). But it can be shown that, with a total budget surplus, the change in the 
horizontal intercept will be in the same direction, while the vertical intercept will 
move in the opposite direction. The precise shift in the PDC will depend on the 
change in its slope. This, it turns out, depends positively on the sign of the difference 
gdt-1 - gdA . Hence the effect of a combination of growth rates such as that at point F, 
where gdt-1 > gdA  and thus the differential of the slope with respect to a change in Gy 
and by both in the same direction is positive, the PDC shifts to something like the 
dotted line in Figure 1.  
There remains the implications of points lying on the interval DH, where gG > gdt-1, 
and thus where Gy is rising but where by is falling. The slope of the PDC must lessen 
for a given tax rate, t. The complexity in such cases concerns the movement in the 
intercepts of the PDC; though on “reasonable” values for parameters,10 the movement 
of the PDC will be something like PDCH in Figure 1.11 
 
Figure 2 below depicts the FDC. We assume for the purposes of discussion that 
m < eYt-1, 
12 so that the FDC is negatively sloped; and that the current account is in 
deficit (i.e. CADYt-1 = m + eYt-1 .r –XYt-1 > 0) so that both the vertical and horizontal 
intercepts of the FDC are positive (assuming a positive level of foreign debt). 
Analogously to the PDC, combinations of gXt and gdt-1 lying on the FDC entail a 
constant foreign debt to income ratio. Points to the right (left) of the FDC entail a fall 
(rise) in eY.  
 
As with the PDC depicted in Figure 1, Figure 2 provides an illustration of the three 
possible shifts of the FDC, depending on the combination of gXt and gdt-1.
13  
 
                                                 
10
 In particular, using long-run historical values for the Australian economy (see Table 1 below and also 
footnote 7 above). 
11 Differentiating 
y y
t 1 t 1
y
t 1
G b .r t
G t
− −
−
+ −
+
 with respect to both Gy and by gives ( ) ( )
( )
y y
t 1 t 1
y y
t 1 t 1
2y
t 1
b dr. G t d 2t b .r .
G t
G− −− −
−
++ −
+
. 
The sign of this differential depends on the relative size of dbyt-1 and dGyt-1 as well as the relative size of 
the coefficients r.(Gyt-1+t) and (2t-byt-1.r) which are both positive. 
12
 Again, which appears to accord with historical data for Australia. 
13
 A comparison of the implications of points A and C is interesting in this regard. Since both points are 
below the 45o line, XY will be falling in both cases. However, point C entails a rising eY while point A 
entails a falling eY. But the FDC is shifting in the same direction – upwards; meaning that in order to 
prevent a rising debt in the future the rate of growth of exports has to be higher than previously for any 
given growth rate of demand. Interestingly the upward shift is larger in relation to point A, even though 
eY is falling. The most reasonable interpretation of this is that the larger apparent fall in the ratio of 
exports to income XY associated with point A (i.e. the excess of the growth rate of demand, and, by 
assumption, income over the growth rate of exports is larger at A) is sufficient to offset the fact that 
point C entails a rising eY while point A entails a falling eY. 
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FIGURE 2 – DEMAND GROWTH AND THE FOREIGN DEBT CONSTRAINT 
 
Figure 3 plots both the PDC and FDC together with a 45o line: the vertical axis 
measures values for both gGt and gXt, with gdt-1 measured on the horizontal axis. Since, 
as noted above, the PDC lies wholly above the the 45o line then the intersection of the 
PDC and FDC will also lie above the 45o line.  
Figure 3 also depicts indicates a number of different regions – combinations of growth 
rates of the autonomous components of demand and growth rates of aggregate 
demand – distinguished according to the implications for XY, GY, eY and BY. Arguably, 
the most desirable regions for policy makers would be regions 2 and 3, since only in 
these regions are both debt to income ratios declining (assuming of course that less 
debt relative to GDP is preferred to more by policy makers). 
 
FIGURE 3 – COMBINED PUBLIC AND FOREIGN DEBT CONSTRAINTS 
 
However, given the assumption made above (p. 5) regarding the relative concern on 
the part of policy makers about public sector debt as a proportion of income, one 
could argue that, at least temporarily policy makers would tolerate being in regions 4 
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and 5, where eY is rising but bY is falling; with regions 1 and 6 being the least 
desirable of all.14  
 
4. One possible policy scenario 
 
Figure 4 below suggests one possible scenario that may confront policy makers. It 
serves also to illustrate the complexity of the demand-debt dynamics under 
consideration. Assume that the growth in demand in t-1 is equal to gdA and an 
exogenously given growth rate of export demand equal to gX. Since point F lies to the 
left of the initial FDC (FDC0), this combination of aggregate demand (and income 
between t and t-1) and export growth rates entails a rising foreign debt to income ratio 
between t and t-1. Suppose initially that the growth rate of government expenditure is 
gGA – i.e. point P, which, being on the initial PDC (PDC0), implies a constant public 
debt to income ratio between t and t-1. 
 
It is also clear that point P and F imply a rising GY and falling XY respectively. On the 
basis of the discussion so far, these changes, together with the unchanged public 
sector debt ratio and a rising foreign debt ratio, will lead to shifts of the debt 
constraints to something like PDC1 and FDC1. Ignoring any changes in the growth 
rate of demand, these shifts clearly imply that, first, with an unchanged export growth 
rate, the foreign debt problem will be exacerbated, in the sense of requiring an even 
higher rate of growth of income than previously to stabilize foreign debt as a 
proportion of income (e.g. gdA1, gX); and second, to maintain an unchanged public debt 
ratio, either the rate of growth of income will have to rise or the rate of growth of 
government expenditure will have to be reduced (e.g. gGA1, gdA). 
 
FIGURE 4 – ONE POSSIBLE POLICY SCENARIO
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But there is a further complication here. Because the original points P and F entail that 
gG > gX, then α (equation (11)) will be rising, and, assuming the rate of growth of 
autonomous demand, a, is initially below gG, a will also be rising (equations (12) and 
 
14
 Of course, at any point in time policy makers may find themselves in two different regions, since the 
rate of growth of exports and the rate of growth of government expenditure will typically differ.  
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(13)). Equation (9) in turn implies that this will affect the rate of growth of aggregate 
demand, via a positive impact of rising a on gd.  
 
For the sake of argument and pursuing this scenario a little further, suppose the net 
impact of the rising rate of growth of autonomous demand on gd is positive, so that, in 
terms of  Figure 4, gd is pushed to the right of gdA, e.g. something like gdA2. This 
would of course require less of a cutback in the rate of growth of government 
expenditure, consistent with a stable public debt to income ratio and it would also 
work to slow the rise in the foreign debt to income ratio.  
 
Although crude and highly simplified one interesting possibility that suggests itself in 
the above discussion relates to the possibilities – including possible dilemmas - for 
policy makers concerning the rate of growth of government expenditure.  
 
The economy may well find itself in a position where the rate of growth of exports 
and income are such that the foreign debt ratio will rise if the rate of growth of exports 
does not rise. If the latter cannot be manipulated systematically, the only way a rise in 
the foreign debt ratio can be avoided (given the assumptions made in the paper so far) 
is if the rate of growth of income rises. Yet, to the extent that the latter is itself driven 
by autonomous demand, then the only possibility to avoid a rising foreign debt ratio is 
through a rise in the rate of growth of government spending. The obvious question 
here is the extent to which such a change in the rate of growth of government 
spending is consistent with the desired public debt outcomes of policy makers?15  
 
5. Demand growth and debt: steady states 
 
Unfortunately however the framework above – specifically an analysis in terms of 
shifting PDC and FDC - is rather inadequate and cumbersome in addressing such 
questions; quite aside from the fact that for the most part the analysis so far has 
assumed that the expected rate of growth of demand has remained unchanged, so that 
the rate of growth of income mirrored that of demand, with a lag. Even with this 
assumption, the movements of both the PDC and FDC will be considerable even over 
a small number of periods. 
 
For this reason we turn our attention in the following section to what might allow for 
a better grasp of the dynamics of demand and debt, viz., dynamic simulation of the 
model. For this purpose, however we need to complete the model outlined above with 
some proposition about the determinants of the rate of growth of government 
expenditure, gGt. As a prelude to this, we first identify the equilibria of the model, as 
specified so far. 
 
In effect, the present model offers three different steady states, according to whether 
the rate of growth of government expenditure exceeds, is equal to or is less than the 
exogenously given rate of growth of export demand. Recalling from equations (13) 
                                                 
15 Of course, a second type of policy scenario – not illustrated in Figure 4 – involves the reverse of that 
discussed above and is probably more fortuitous.  Suppose for whatever reason gX is persistently above 
gG, so that the growth rate of autonomous demand and the growth rate of output tend over time towards 
the growth rate of exports, gX. Hence GY will tend to fall acting in turn to relax the PDC facing policy 
makers.  
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the growth rate of autonomous demand will converge on the greatest of the two 
growth rates of exports and government expenditure; and that a steady state is 
characterized by constant ratios of autonomous demands to income, then a difference 
between the rates of growth of government expenditure and export demand requires 
that either GY or XY  tends to zero as the economy approaches the steady state growth 
trajectory.  
 
Equation (9) for the growth rate of aggregate demand can be written explicitly for the 
steady state case where realized and expected growth rates of aggregate demand, are 
all equal to the rate of growth of autonomous demand, so that  
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
ˆˆ. . . . . .
ˆ ˆˆ . .
y y
G Y X
1 a 1 m c t c r e 1 a c a v c r b
1 g G 1 g X
+ + + + = + + +
+ + + + Y  …..(9a) 
where the ‘^’ script refers to the steady state value of the variable. Since the steady 
state should also be characterized by constant debt (both public and foreign) to 
income ratios, then in view of equations (15) and (17), one should have   
 
  
( ) ( )
( )
ˆ .ˆ
Y
y
G t 1 a
b
a r
− += −         …..(15a) 
and     
( ) ( )
( )
ˆ.
ˆ
Y
y
1 a m X
e
a r
+ −= −        …..(17a) 
respectively.  
 
Rewriting the steady state public debt and government expenditure ratios (to income) 
in terms of their relation to their corresponding historical ratios, so that  
 
ˆ .y bb γ= Yb   and  ˆ .Y YGG Gγ= ,  
one can then rewrite expressions 9(a) and 15(a) respectively as  
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
ˆ. . . . . . .
ˆˆ . . .
y y
b
G Y X
G
1 a 1 m c t c r e 1 a c a v c r b
1 g G 1 g X
γ
γ
+ + + + = + + +
+ + + + Y  …..(9b) 
 
( ) ( )
( )
. .
.
Y
Gy
b
G t 1 a
b
a r
γγ − += −      …..(15b). 
In view of equations (13) we can also write for the steady state value of ‘a’, 
 ( )ˆ ,X Ga Max g g= ˆ       …..(13a) 
 
where Yb and YG are exogenously given historical average or historical peak values of 
the corresponding ratio.  
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Together, equations (9a), (15a), (17a) and (13a) contain 6 unknowns: 
 Consider the case where  is set equal to the rate of 
growth of export by policy makers. The rate of growth of autonomous demand ‘a’ will 
therefore be equal to , by means of equation (13a), so that the remaining 
three equations (9a), (15a) and(17a) consist of four unknowns:  
This case appears to leave open the possibility that one of either (via 
ˆˆ ˆ  and .y Gb Ga, e , , g ,  Xγ γ
ˆ g
Y
X
 
ˆ Gg
G g=
ˆˆ  and .y Yb Ge , ,  Xγ γ
ˆ ˆor y Yb G Gγ ) 
could be set by policymakers exogenously. Hence, at least in this case, policymakers 
could set as well as setting eitherˆ G X g g=  or  b Gγ γ . 
 
But how general is this case, specifically, in general is it possible for policymakers to 
set the steady state rate of growth of government expenditure as well as bγ ? The 
answer to this is no. Where  the steady state solution will involve either 
 equal to zero and thus, effectively, and either  are the two 
exogenous variables. 
ˆ   Gg g≠ X
Y Y
X
ˆ G
ˆ ˆorYG  X ˆ Gg ˆ ˆorYG  X
 
Hence, if the steady state rate of growth of government expenditure differs from the 
exogenous rate of growth of export demand, the three equations (9a), (15a), (17a) and 
(13a) provide only one degree of freedom: The rate of growth of autonomous demand 
will be equal to either , according to equation (13a) depending on which of 
these is largest. The remaining three equations would contain four unknowns: 
 along with one of , the other being equal to zero. Thus if the 
steady state rate of growth of government expenditure is set exogenously at a level 
different from gX, steady state γb is endogenous and thus policymakers cannot set 
exogenously the steady state public debt to income ratio. On the other hand, 
policymakers could set this latter ratio exogenously, but they cannot also choose a 
particular steady state growth rate of government expenditure.  
ˆ  or Gg g
 orGγˆ y be , , gγ ˆ YX
 
Hence an added degree of flexibility exists for policymakers, at least in relation to 
steady state trajectories, in setting a debt to income ratio as well as the rate of growth 
of government expenditure, only where the latter is set equal to the exogenous rate of 
growth of export demand.  
 
Of course, another way to look at this is that by choosing a growth rate of government 
expenditure different from gX, policymakers are effectively also choosing either a 
steady state export to income ratio ˆ YX equal to zero (for the case where ) or 
a steady state government expenditure to income ratio equal to zero (for the case 
where ). In either case, policymakers have to live with the resultant 
endogenously determined γb. Thus in the case above, where  is set by 
policymakers equal to gX, a target and thus exogenous ratio of public debt to income 
means that policymakers have to live with a particular ratio of government 
expenditure to income.  
ˆ Gg g> X
X
ˆ YG
ˆ Gg g<
ˆ Gg
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6. Closing the model 
 
The question arises at this point as to which of the three types of equilibria – 
corresponding respectively to ˆ Gg g
>
X
<=   - is the most relevant. This is essentially a 
question of the stability of the different equilibria. One way of approaching this is to 
consider, whether, starting from the steady state characterized by gG = gX, and for a 
reasonably intuitive hypothesis about the rate of growth of government expenditure, 
the economic system’s response to a shock which pushes gX temporarily away from 
gG, leads to a growth rate equal to the new value of gX.  
 
Taking this last question a step further requires hypotheses about the determination of 
both gG and the expected rate of growth of autonomous demand (equation (4)). 
 
(i) The rate of growth of government expenditure: As a starting point, the approach 
adopted here is to suppose that the rate of growth of government expenditure reflects 
three concerns of policy makers. First, that there may be a limited counter-cyclical 
role for this expenditure. Hence we assert that if actual growth for example falls short 
of the expected rate of growth of demand, ceteris paribus policy makers will consider 
increasing gG. Second, we suppose that concern about foreign debt has an influence 
on fiscal policy, via the belief that the current account deficit is influenced to some 
extent directly by the public sector budget balance.16 Third, we suggest that the 
influence of these first two considerations is subject to an overriding concern that the 
ratio of public sector debt to income does not grow over time. 
  
In putting together these three considerations in a compact form, suitable for a 
simulation exercise, we suppose that the rate of growth of government expenditure is 
determined at time t according to the following rule: 
( ) ( )* . .G GB de d Y Yt t t 2 t 1 t tg g g g e eμ φ− − −= + − − − 1      ….. (24(i)) 
gGt is assumed to be set in each period on the basis of that growth rate of government 
expenditure, , which would generate - given the existing debt to income ratio, 
government expenditure to income ratio, and actual and expected  growth rates of 
demand - a public debt to income ratio equal to a proportion γb of the historical 
average  value, 
GB
t g
Yb ; but modified by any existing gap between actual and expected 
rates of growth of demand (this being a proxy for under and overutilization of 
capacity);17 and any growth in the foreign debt to income ratio. Substituting 
. yb bγ for ,  for in equation (15) and solving for  yields  Ytb GBt g Gt g GBtg
                                                 
16
 In turn reflecting a view that the current account deficit is a reflection of the public sector budget 
balance, or more generally that it reflects a deficiency of national saving and thus, given private sector 
saving, a deficiency of public sector saving. Needless to say this is not a view which the present author 
accepts. 
17
 Cyclical fluctuations in economic activity should see some tendency to counter-cyclical movements 
in the size of public outlays as a proportion of income, via the operation of automatic stabilizers. In 
effect, expression (24) assumes, with μ  > 0, that there will be in addition some discretionary changes 
in the rate of growth of government expenditure consistent with the direction of such automatic 
stabilizers. 
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( ) ( ) ( ). . .y y yt b t 1GB
t Y
t 1
1 g t b 1 r b G
g
G
γ Yt 1− −
−
+ + − + −=    …..(25) 
 
The second term on the right-hand side of (24) is the counter-cyclical aspect in 
government activity: it is assumed that in a cyclical upturn, where gd > gde, policy 
makers will be prepared to enforce a fall in the ratio of government expenditure to 
income and conversely, in a cyclical downturn where gd < gde. The third term on the 
right-hand side of (24) represents the negative effect of a rising foreign debt to income 
ratio on the desired rate of growth of government expenditure. 
 
The second determination of gGt used for the purposes of simulation modifies the 
influence of and inserts what might be termed a “conservative bias” in fiscal 
policy. In particular, we assume that policymakers are prepared to lower gGt below gGt 
(ignoring the influence of counter cyclical concerns and concerns about foreign debt) 
to try and restore the public debt ratio to its desired level, but they feel no such 
obligation to raise gGt when it falls below . Thus,  
GB
t g
GB
tg
 ( ) ( ) ( ….. (24(ii))18 )yt 2e− −−Gp GB Gp de d yt t t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1g Min g ,g g g eμ θ− − −= + − −
Note that, according to both equation (24i) and (24ii), the rate of growth of 
government expenditure could only stabilize with an unchanging foreign debt to 
income ratio; normal utilization of productive capacity (to the extent capacity 
utilization is reflected in the divergence of actual and forecast demand growth) and 
the stabilization of the debt to income and government expenditure to income ratios.  
 
Interestingly also, this determination of the rate of growth of government expenditure, 
together with the dynamics of demand and output embodied in equations (4), (9), (10) 
and (13), in principle suggests a mechanism by which the rate of growth of 
government expenditure would be regulated by the exogenous rate of growth of 
export demand. Consider for example the case where initially gG < gX. Since the rate 
of growth of autonomous demand is governed over time by the largest of gG and gX, if 
                                                 
18
 Strictly speaking, simulations were conducted in relation to expression (24(ii)) using the following 
rule:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )Gp Gp Gp GB de d y yt t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 t 1 tg g .Pos g g g g e eω μ θ− − − − −= − − + − − − 2−  
Where the operator ‘Pos’ means that where , then 
, otherwise, 
Gp GB
t 1 tg g− >)( ) (Gp GB Gp GBt 1 t t 1 t.Pos g g . g gω ω− −− = − ( )Gp GBt 1 t.Pos g g 0−ω − = . Hence where 
, and assuming ω < 1, the rate of growth of government expenditure is  Gp GBt 1 tg g− >
( ) ( ) ( )Gp Gp GB de d y yt t 1 t t 1 t 1 t 1 t 2g g . 1 .g g g e eω ω μ θ− − −= − + + − − −− − . In other words, for this case, that 
part of the rate of growth government expenditure associated with a desired public debt to income ratio, 
is effectively a weighted average of the most recent growth rate of government expenditure and the 
growth rate required to attain the desired long-run debt ratio. Alternatively put, where , and 
ignoring countercyclical and foreign debt impacts, the rate of growth of government expenditure is 
equal to last periods rate, but discounted by an amount in part detrmined by the extent to which recent 
growth in government expenditure exceeds the rate required to attain the long-run desired public debt 
to income ratio. 
Gp GB
t 1 tg g− >
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gG persistently below gX entails that ‘a’ will grow faster than gG, and eventually 
demand, both expected and actual and in turn output will grow faster than government 
expenditure. GY will be falling; and if this fall pushes byt below . yb bγ , then gGB will 
rise and with it gG.19 Conversely, with gG persistently above gX, XY will be falling, and 
in so far as this pushes eyt up the government expenditure function would entail some 
downward pressure on gG. 
  
(ii) The expected rate of growth of autonomous demand: Concerning the expected rate 
of growth of autonomous demand, we assume that producers form these expectations 
on the basis of a long-run historical trend component to autonomous demand and a 
part which reflects more recent changes in that demand. For simplicity, we therefore 
propose the following formulation for the expectation at time t of growth in 
autonomous demand between t and t+1:  
 
( )exp Hist avta .a 1 .aδ δ= + − t      …..(26) 
 
where Hista is an historical average rate of growth for total autonomous demand and 
 is a moving average of the total autonomous demand growth rate over the last n 
periods; and 0 < δ < 1. But we also endogeneise 
av
ta
Hista , making it a function of the 
longer–run trend realized growth rate of autonomous demand. In this case  
( )Hist Fcst LRav Fcstt 1 t t 1a a . a aη−= + − −      …..(27) 
   
where in expression (26) represents the shorter-run trend in the growth rate of 
autonomous demand. 
av
ta
 
7. Demand and debt dynamics I: the local stability of gG = gX  
 
Equations (4), (9)-(11), (15), (17)-(18), (22), (24) and (26)-(27) provide the basis for a 
simulation of the dynamics of demand and debt. In particular, they constitute a 
recursive dynamic system: period t growth rates of demand actual and expected, the 
growth rates of output, government expenditure and autonomous demand, together 
with ratios of autonomous demand, exports, government expenditure, and public and 
foreign debt to income can be derived from the values of the same variables in 
previous periods together with the values of the parameters, t, m, r, c, ε, x, v, μ ,θ, γb, 
and Yb together with the exogenous rate of growth of exports. Alternatively put, 
solved values of the endogenous variables for period t, together with parameter values 
and gX, are sufficient to enable the solutions to the endogenous variables for period 
t+1. 
 
The simulations discussed below are designed specifically to shed light on the 
stability of the equilibrium characterized by gG = gX. To this end, it is assumed that the 
system is initially moving along its steady state trajectory and is then subject to a 
shock which pushes the exogenously given growth rate of exports and the actual 
                                                 
19
 This of course assumes that any reduction in gG due to an excess of gd over gde and/or a rising ey is 
not be sufficiently large enough to offset the rise in gGB. 
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growth rate of output apart. Unless otherwise specified, the shock in question pushes 
up the rate of growth of export demand.20 
  
The key results of dynamic computer simulation of the model are depicted in Figures 
5-8. Figure 5, panel (a), shows growth trajectories for the case where gG is determined 
according to equation (24(i)). 
 
Panel (b) shows the results for exactly the same model and parameters, except for a 
larger steady state public debt to income ratio (0.4 instead of 0.2) and a positive , 
that is, net steady state external liabilities. It is immediately noticeable that this change 
eliminates the tendency for damped cycles; and suggests that with the larger desired 
public debt to income ratio and one which is targeted by policymakers each period, 
fiscal policy contributes – i.e. exacerbates – cyclical fluctuations in growth rates of 
expenditure and output. Perhaps not surprisingly , particularly in view of 24(i), a 
higher value for the coefficient μ – which governs the extent of the “counter-cyclical” 
fiscal policy response – reduces the extent (i.e. amplitude) of fluctuations in the 
growth rate of demand.  
yeˆ
 
It is interestingly to reflect a little further on this last result. Panel (c)(ii) compares the 
trajectory of the public debt to income ratio for the two cases – the trajectory 
associated with 5 (b) and the trajectory  associated with 5 (c)(i) with the higher value 
of μ, and hence with what one might interpret as a more “activist” counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy.21 Interestingly, the fluctuations in the public debt to income ratio are 
clearly less pronounced with the higher value of μ, as is the average ratio of public 
debt to income. Certainly, in this case, at least, a more activist fiscal policy, to the 
extent that it is able to “smooth” fluctuations in the growth rate of demand and 
income, does not entail larger public debt to income fluctuations or indeed a larger 
average public debt to income ratio. 
 
The comparison of the results depicted in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 5, and thus the 
result of having a larger desired public debt to income ratio, does the raise the issue of 
whether and to what extent the alternative government expenditure rule – represented 
by expression (24(ii)) might stabilize the system. Figure 6 illustrates the same case as 
in Figure 5 (b) but with this alternative rule for government expenditure growth. This 
change quite obviously makes a significant difference to the system’s dynamics; with 
gradual convergence of growth rates to the new higher growth rate of export demand. 
 
The remaining simulations for the model make use of this alternative government 
expenditure rule: responses of growth rates and of debt and expenditure ratios to an 
exogenous increase in gX and separately an exogeneous decrease in gX, are depicted in 
Figure 7 Panels (a) – (b). These simulations typically consider a larger desired public 
debt ratio, even compared with the case depicted in Figure 5, panel (c), but a smaller 
accelerator coefficient. This combination clearly stabilizes the system compared with 
earlier simulations and produces asymptotic stability in growth rates, in line with the 
                                                 
20
 Initial values for parameters and lagged endogenous variables for simulations are discussed in the 
Appendix. 
21
 In the sense that for any given degree of capacity over or under-utilization, the response in terms of a 
change in the rate of growth of government expenditure is larger. 
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new steady state rate – i.e. equal to the new growth rate of export demand - debt ratios 
and ratios of autonomous demand to income.  
 
A final set of simulation results are depicted in Figure 8 for the case where the steady 
state rate of growth, given by the rate of growth of export demand, both before and 
after the shock, is lower than the rate of interest on debt. As is evident from that 
figure, the alternative government expenditure function, along with a lower value for 
the accelerator coefficient allows for asymptotic stability in this case also. 
 
8. Demand and debt dynamics II: expenditure and debt ratios 
 
There are two particularly interesting features of the results for these latter 
simulations. First, the rate of growth of government expenditure tends over the long-
run to come into line with the new rate of growth of exports. In the cases depicted in 
Figures 6 and 7 (a), where the economy responds to a positive shock to gX, the growth 
rate of government expenditure consistent with the “desired” (maximum) public debt 
to income ratio exceeds the actual growth rate of government expenditure. Hence, 
from expression (24(ii)), gGB becomes irrelevant and gGp is effectively governed by 
it’s value in the most recent past together with a countercyclical and a component 
responding to movement in the foreign debt ratio.  
  
In the case of Figure 7(a) the initial impact of the rise in gX is positive on the rate of 
growth of demand and output; but this takes time to impact, via expectations about 
autonomous demand growth. Hence there is a slow reaction of expected demand 
growth, and actual demand growth and the rate of growth of output. For some time 
therefore gy is below the new higher gX, so that XY is falling and with it the foreign 
debt ratio, ey.  
 
With regard to government expenditure the lag between the expected growth rate of 
demand means that the difference ( )de dt 2 t 1g g− −− in equation (24(ii)) is for the most part 
negative, this having a negative impact on the growth rate of government expenditure, 
at least initially. After a time however, the positive impact of a falling foreign debt 
ratio on the rate of growth of government expenditure begins to outweigh the former 
influence, so that the rate of growth government expenditure begins to rise. To the 
extent that the expected and actual growth rates of demand tend to become closer, the 
difference  ( )de dt 2 t 1g g− −− , becomes smaller, and the relative impact of the falling 
foreign debt ratio on gGp becomes larger. Hence, while demand and income growth 
remain below the new higher level of gX and XY rises and ey falls, gGp is gradually 
pushed upwards in line with the new higher gX.  
 
In relation to public debt, the initial fall in the rate of growth of government 
expenditure, below the level consistent with the maintenance of the initial steady state 
and desired maximum value (i.e. γb. Yb ). But while  gGp is gradually rising to the new 
higher gX, gGst (the rate required to maintain debt constant ) is gradually falling from a  
level above the new higher gX.  
 
The increase in the rate of growth of income resulting from the increase in gX also 
results in a fall in Gy and in by. In turn this raises gGst, the growth rate of government 
expenditure consistent with a constant by; more importantly this rate is raised above 
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the new higher gX.  As the actual growth rate of government expenditure rises towards 
the new higher gX over time (for the reasons stated above), gGst starts to fall towards 
gX. In other words, part of the longer-run dynamics for the simulations depicted in 
Figures 6 and 7 (a) involves gGst  and  gGp both converging on the new higher gX, but 
the former from above and the latter from below. This dynamics also involves the 
public debt to income ratio stabilizing at a level lower than the “desired” maximum 
equal to γb. Yb and which is relevant to gGB. Hence, in the new steady state, the rate of 
growth of the economy is equal to the higher growth rate of export demand, and the 
rate of growth of government expenditure converges on that rate. But, ˆ .y ybb bγ< in 
the new steady state.  
 
An alternative scenario, at least with respect to the evolution of the public debt ratio, 
can be seen in Figures 7 (b) and 8. Recall that the former deals with a negative shock 
to gX, while the latter deals with a positive shock to gX, but in a situation where gX < r. 
In relation to the public debt ratio, these two cases differ from those of Figures 6 and 
7 (a) in that the growth rate of government expenditure required to maintain the public 
debt to income ratio constant (gGst) in the long-run stabilizes at a level higher than the 
actual growth rate of government expenditure, yet the public debt ratio is constant at 
zero. This reflects a constraint built into the model, (which, as it turns out is binding 
only in the case of these two simulations) by way of lower bound at zero for this debt 
ratio.22  
 
In the case of the negative shock to gX (Figure 7(b)), one of the initial responses to 
that shock is a significant fall in the rate of growth of government expenditure. And 
this is a response to an initial rise in the public debt ratio, because of a significant 
initial drop in income growth (responding in turn to the fall in gX) relative to 
government expenditure growth and in turn rising GY. This rise in by pushes gGB 
below gGp and thus (via 24(ii)) constrains gGp. Over time, this fall in gGp  reduces GY 
and in turn increases the rate of growth of government expenditure consistent with a 
constant by (gGst). With gGp below the growth rate of income, GY continues to fall, until 
the public debt to income ratio drops to zero. In the longer-run, gGst continues to rise 
and only stabilizes when GY stabilizes, and hence when gGp adapts fully along with 
income to the new lower rate of growth of exports. 
 
In the case depicted in Figure 8, the system’s response involves a more pronounced 
cyclical fluctuation in growth rates, compared with the same type of shock for the 
cases depicted in Figures 6 and 7 (a). The fluctuation in the actual growth rate of 
government expenditure (gGp) and in the ratio of government expenditure to income 
(GY) are such that the latter is sufficiently low enough that the public debt to income 
ratio is reduced to zero before gGst (the growth rate of government expenditure 
consistent with a constant by) is brought into line with the higher growth rate of 
exports. 
                                                 
22
 Looking at expression (14), this lower bound on by effectively means, that starting from a zero public 
debt, any primary budget surplus (i.e. G < T) does not entail an accumulation of government assets 
(ignoring seinorage), but rather a contraction in domestic liquidity. As such, the lower bound on public 
debt, assumes domestic monetary expansion, this being required to maintain (at least domestic) interest 
rates fixed, as is assumed throughout this paper. The other way to look at this is that with by = 0, and 
gGp < gGst , it is possible for policymakers to increase the rate of growth of government expenditure 
without increasing the public debt ratio. A more thorough and realistic analysis would relax this 
assumption and allow for policymakers in this case to increase gGp in line with gGst. 
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9. Conclusion  
 
This paper has attempted to shed some light on the dynamics of growth and debt in 
terms of a demand-led growth model. In particular, it has focused primarily on the 
dynamics associated with a situation where one of the two autonomous components of 
demand is beyond control for policy makers; while their use of the component under 
their control – government expenditure – is subject to a public debt constraint and also 
reflects concerns about the evolution of foreign debt as a proportion of income.  
 
Most significantly, the paper shows, via the results of computer simulations, that a set 
of parameters exist consistent with a stable set of dynamics for a demand-led growth 
model; where government expenditure growth reflects concerns over public debt and 
foreign debt ratios and arguably competing pressures for the use of fiscal policy as a 
countercyclical tool. In particular, these simulations demonstrates the existence of a 
set of parameters for which the steady state characterized by a rate of growth of 
government expenditure equal to the exogenous rate of growth of export demand is 
stable. Computer simulations of the model also demonstrate the existence of a 
mechanism pushing the growth rate of government expenditure in line with the 
exogenous growth rate of exports over time. 
 
Clearly, the analysis above is preliminary in at least three respects: first, the 
assumption of an exogenously given and constant rate of growth of exports needs to 
be relaxed and consideration given to behaviour with an exogenous but fluctuating 
growth rate of exports. Secondly, further analysis should consider the relative 
weighting of autonomous demand and the economy’s growth as a whole vis a vis  
growth in a producer’s own sector, in the formation of expectations by producers 
about future growth, within an explicit multi-sectoral approach; viz., a multi-
commodity, multi-industry approach.23 Third, a more flexible government expenditure 
rule would seem appropriate in light of the cases where the public debt to income ratio 
falls close to zero and which would allow, realistically, for a different response from 
policymakers than that considered in the simulations discussed in this paper. 
 
                                                 
23
 I am indebted to a participant at the Society of Heterodox Economists conference (University of 
NSW, Dec. 2008) for impressing this point upon me. 
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 (c) (i) Effects of a higher μ 
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 (c) (ii) Effects of a higher μ 
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Figure 7  
(a) ( ) ( ) ( ), . .Gp GB Gp de d Y Yt t t 1 t 2 t 1 t t 1g Min g g g g e eμ φ− − −= + − − −−  ; exogenous increase in gX 
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(b) ( ) ( ) ( ), . .Gp GB Gp de d Y Yt t t 1 t 2 t 1 t t 1g Min g g g g e eμ φ− − −= + − − −−  ; exogenous decrease in gX 
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Figure 7 (b) con’t. 
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Figure 8  
 (a) ( ) ( ) ( ), . .Gp GB Gp de d Y Yt t t 1 t 2 t 1 t t 1g Min g g g g e eμ φ− − −= + − − −−  ; exogenous increase in gX; gX < r 
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Appendix 
 
The analysis of stability: 
 
In principle, two methods are available for the study of stability of the system given by 
equations  (4), (9)-(11), (15), (17)-(18), (22), (24) and (26)-(27). The first involves an 
examination of the local stability properties of the model’s equilibria. As is well known, this 
entails examining the eigenvalues of the relevant Jacobian matrix for the difference equation 
system  (4), (9)-(11), (15), (17)-(18), (22), (24) and (26)-(27), evaluated at equilibrium. For 
the purposes of the present paper,  only limited use is made of this procedure: it is used 
exclusively as a means for determining “plausible” values of certain key coefficients, viz., the 
accelerator coefficient ‘v’ and the consumption propensity, ‘c’ and ‘ε’, the coefficient 
governing the relative weighting of expectations about autonomous demand growth in the 
expectation about overall demand growth.  
 
More precisely, to arrive at plausible values for these two coefficients, an analysis of 
eigenvalues for different ‘v’, ‘c’, and ‘ε’ with all other reaction coefficients – θ, η, ω, μ and 
x– set to zero. For example, using parameter and steady state values for the simulation 
depicted in Figure 5(a), but with  θ, η, ω, μ and x set to zero, the eigenvalues of the (8x8) 
Jacobian matrix can be represented as a function of the values of ε. Figure A1 below, shows 
that all the eigenvalues are less than unity in absolute value for 0 < ε < 1, thus suggesting 
stability in the vicinity of the steady state given by gG = gX. 
Figure A1: Eigenvalues for Jacobian as a function of ‘ε’ 
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The preferred method for the examination of stability employed here is computer simulation, 
albeit, bearing in mind the behaviour of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian for key coefficients, 
such as v, c and ε.  
 
Parameter values and initial values for the lagged endogenous variables for simulations  are 
provided in Tables A1 and A2 below. With regard to the latter, taking the first period of the 
simulation for which endogenous variables are solved as period ‘t’, this requires initial values 
for the following lagged endogenous variables: , dt -2 t 1g → −
de
t 2 t 1g − → − , 
, , , , , ,t 20 t 1a − → −
X
t 1g −
G
t 1g −
exp
t 1a −
Fcst
t 1a −
av
t 1a −
Y
t 2 t 1e − → − ,
Y
t 1G − ,
Y
t 1X − ,
Y
t 1b − , t 1α − .24 
                                                 
24
 Note that, since the model is started in its steady state, the values for Xt 1g − and are those listed in 
the third last and last rows respectively of Table A1. 
Y
t 1b −
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TABLE  A1: Parameters 
 Fig. 5 (a) Fig. 5(b) Fig. 5 (c) Fig. 6 Fig. 7 (a) Fig. 7(b) Fig. 8 
        
c 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.9 0.9 0.9 
v 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.02 
t 0.24 0.4 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.3 
m 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
r 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.075 0.075 0.18 
x 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.025 0.025 0.025 
ε 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
σ 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2500 
μ 0.5 0.5 1.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.075 
θ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 
η 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
δ 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 
γ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ω 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.2 
gX 
(before 
shock) 
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 
gX (after 
shock) 
0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.17 
yb
 
 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.65 0.65 0.65 
        
 
 
TABLE  A2: Lagged endogenous variables 
 
 Fig. 5 (a) Fig. 5(b) Fig. 5 (c) Fig. 6 Fig. 7 (a) Fig. 7(b) Fig. 8 
        
d
t -2 t 1g → −  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 
de
t 2 t 1g − → −  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 
t 20 t 1a − → −  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 
G
t 1g −  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 
exp
t 1a −  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 
Fcst
t 1a −  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 
av
t 1a −  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 
Y
t 2 t 1e − → −  -0.323636 0.025974 0.025974 0.025974 0.207403 0.207403 0.066288 
Y
t 1G −  0.265 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.317708 0.317708 0.283043 
Y
t 1−  0.190455 0.146753 0.146753 0.146753 0.128396 0.128396 0.151729 X
t 1α −
 
 1.391408 3.066372 3.066372 3.066372 2.474449 2.474449 1.865451 
        
 
 
 
 
 
